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1.  Introduction 
 
Education is becoming vital in the new world of information. Knowledge is rapidly 
accredited replacing raw materials and labour as the most critical input for survival and 
success. Higher education enhances a country’s capacity for participation in an increasingly 
knowledge-based world economy and has the potential to enhance economic growth and 
reduce poverty. Thus higher education has assumed even greater significance for developing 
countries, especially for those like India experiencing services-led growth.1 Therefore spread 
of higher education and formation of skill have been the top priorities in a developing 
economy which is typically described as scarce of skilled labour. Now with the progress of 
economic liberalization, as the role of services sector is predominant, the question of 
shortage of skilled labour arises in a more pronounced way. That is why with a sense of 
urgency; the government of India has initiated the national skill development mission. The 
policymakers have been doing intensive exercise as to how this mission could be brought 
into existence and the skill deficit could be mitigated.   
 
The governments of different countries play an important role in spreading education  all over 
the world and devote substantial resources to their education sector. This is especially true in 
developing countries. In some of the developing countries there are statutory bodies of the 
governments for monitoring the functioning of the higher academic institutions. For example, 
in India there is the University Grant Commission (UGC) that has been co-ordinating, 
determining and maintaining standards of university education and teaching in the country for 
the last five decades or so. The UGC allocates grants to the universities and colleges out of its 
own funds for their development or other general purpose and advises the central and state 
government on disbursing grants to the universities out of the Consolidated Fund of India.  
Moreover, the policymakers of the developing countries like India of late are toying with the 
 
1 See Sharma (2007). 
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idea of permitting foreign investment in higher education2 so as to promote competitiveness 
among the public and private institutions and improve the quality of education.  
 
In a typical developing country there is scarcity of both capital and skilled labour. Therefore, 
economic growth induced by foreign capital inflows 3  and skill formation are equally 
important from the perspective of these nations. But these countries are plagued by a 
significant degree of wage inequality among skilled and unskilled labour and this inequality 
has increased considerably over the last two decades. However, it is beyond any doubt that 
inflows of foreign capital and expansion of higher educational facilities and skill formation 
must have important consequences on the relative wage inequality of the country in question.  
 
There is a large theoretical literature that examines the consequences of liberalized economic 
policies including the role of foreign capital in explaining the increasing skilled-unskilled 
wage inequality during the liberalized regime. It includes works of Feenstra and Hanson 
(1996), Marjit and Acharya (2003), Marjit, Beladi and Chakrabarti (2004) and Chaudhuri and 
Yabuuchi (2007). However, none of these papers analyzes the process of endogenous skill 
formation and considers the possibility of foreign capital inflow in education. 4 There is, 
however, a paper by Kar and Beladi (2004) that has studied the welfare implications of skill 
formation and international migration of both skilled and unskilled labour using a four-sector 
 
2 The Government is for allowing 100 percent foreign direct investment (FDI) in higher education and 
hinted at making reservation mandatory in the institutions to be set up by foreign universities in the 
country. As part of India’s WTO commitments made in 2003, the government has proposed 100 
percent FDI in higher education all institutions.  See Hindustan Times dated 06.02.2007. 
 
3 Despite satisfactory progress in liberalizing foreign investment policies, the international mobility of 
capital into or from the developing economies is still far from being perfect. There is an FDI 
regulatory authority in such a country that judges the merits and demerits of any new FDI proposal 
before granting final approval. For example, in India investment in all industries except those in the 
negative list is permissible. Additionally, there are sectoral caps for investing in certain industries. 
FDI is not permitted beyond these caps. FDI can be brought into India through the Automatic Route 
under the Reserve Bank of India and for certain activities through government approval.  
 
4 As related studies, Stark (1998), Chau and Stark (1999) and Fan and Stark (2007) have studied skill 
formation and international migration by paying attention to skill acquisition  incentives created by the 
prospect of migration. 
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general equilibrium framework. But, they have not taken into consideration the capital 
adjustment cost faced by the education sector, infrastructure development scheme of the 
government and the possibility of foreign capital inflow in the education sector.
Besides, they have neither explicitly discussed policy implications of their results nor have 
suggested appropriate measures that can improve relative wage inequality in the economy in 
the presence of skill formation and inflows of foreign capital. 
 
The present paper develops a three-sector general equilibrium model for examining the 
outcomes of an infrastructure development scheme of the government to the education sector 
and inflows of foreign capital on the skilled-unskilled wage inequality in a developing 
economy in the presence of endogenous skill formation. There is a low-skill sector that 
produces an export commodity using unskilled labour and capital. In another sector of the 
economy a high-skill commodity is produced with the help of skilled labour and capital. 
There is a skill formation sector (universities) as well where one unit of unskilled labour and 
some amount of capital are required to produce one unit of skilled labour. The education 
sector faces a capital adjustment cost due to which the price of capital depends positively on 
the amount of capital employed. There is a provision for government financial assistance to 
this sector that lowers the unit capital cost. The economy starts with given endowments of 
both types of labour. The endowment of skilled labour increases and that of unskilled labour 
goes down due to skill formation. This theoretical analysis leads to some interesting results. 
While both the financial assistance policy and the inflows of foreign capital lead to higher 
skill formation, the policies produce dissimilar effects on the wages of skilled and unskilled 
labour. An infrastructure development scheme lowers both the wages while the entry of 
foreign capital produces just the opposite effects on the wages. Furthermore, the effects of the 
policies on the skilled-unskilled wage inequality depend crucially on the relative factor 
intensities of the low-skill and high-skill sectors. The financial assistance scheme improves 
the relative wage inequality when the high-skill sector is capital-intensive while an inflow of 
foreign capital lowers the wage inequality only when the low-skill sector is capital-intensive. 
Which of the two policies the country should implement, therefore, depends on the 
technological, institutional and trade related factors. 
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2. The model and assumptions 
 
Let us consider a small open economy in which there are three sectors with provision for 
endogenous skill formation. One sector is a low-skill (say, an agricultural) sector and 
produces good X. The second sector is a high-skill (say, manufacturing) sector that produces 
an industrial good Y.  The third sector, S, is the skill formation sector where one unit of 
unskilled labour and capital together produce one unit of skilled labour.  It is supposed that 
sector X uses unskilled labour and capital, sector Y uses labour and capital, and sector S uses 
unskilled labour and capital.  
 
The notations and the equations of the GE model are as follows; 
 
W = unskilled wage rate; 
SW  skilled wage rate; 
R  effective return to capital in sector S; 
r  return to capital; 
   financial assistance given to education sector; 
UL   given endowment of unskilled labour; 
SL   given endowment of skilled labour; 
K  given endowment of capital; 
 
Under perfect competition, we have 
1LX KXWa ra          (1) 
S SY KY YW a ra P          (2) 
LS KS KS SWa Ra W Ra W    ⁮
5      (3) 
 
 
5 Note that 1LSa  . 
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where ija  is the amount of the ith factor used in the jth industry to produce one unit of the 
output and YP  is the price of good Y in terms of good X. We assume that good X is 
numeraire, and then the price of good X is unity. 
 
The education sector can also get capital at the competitive rate, r , but in order to use this 
capital effectively they need to spend an additional amount, 
( )KSf a S with (0) 0; '(.), "(.) 0f f f  , to “adapt” the capital stock rented
6 where KSa S is the 
amount of capital employed by this sector.  This sector also receives a matching development 
grant from the government.7 If this sector borrows KSa S amount of capital from the market a 
fraction  of the amount, KSa S , is provided by the government as grant. So effectively total 
cost of capital is given by ( ( ) )KS KS KSra S f a S a S  which is equated to KSRa S where R is 
the effective interest rate. Then we have 
( ) ( )KS KS KSr a S f a S Ra S    
or,  
( ) ( ( ) / )KS KSR r f a S a S          (4.1) 
 
From (4.1) it is easily seen that 
(i) R r  
(ii) 1( ) ( )[ '( ) ( ( ) / )] 0KS KS KS
KS KS
R f a S f a S a S
a S a S
   

 
(Note that [ '( ) ( ( ) / )] 0KS KS KSf a S f a S a S  as capital                  (4.2) 
adjustment costs are assumed to be convex i.e. "(.) 0.f  ) 
(iii) ( ) 1 0R

   

 
 
Exogenously given endowments impose the following resource constraints. 
 
6 It could be that a machine rented needs special adjustments before it can be used in the university. 
For example, for installation of computers and LCD projectors for students there is need to set up a 
laboratory that involves a substantial cost. Besides, there is an additional cost to develop some 
specific computer programs or unique equipments for academic research. It could be a program to 
solve the famous mathematical theorem or a large-scale radio telescope. 
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LX LS LX Ua X a S a X S L          (5) 
SY Sa Y L S           (6) 
KX KY KSa X a Y a S K          (7) 
       
where ,U SL L and K are the initial endowments of unskilled labour, skilled labour and capital, 
respectively.  
 
This completes the specification of our model with the fixed factor endowments and the 
internationally determined prices.  We have seven endogenous variables, 
W , , , , ,SW R r X Y and S which are simultaneously solved from seven independent equations; 
namely, equations (1) – (7). The values of the endogenous variables are obtained in terms of 
the system parameters, , , ,Y U SP L L K  and  . 
 
It may be worth mentioning the characteristic features of the production structure of the 
model. Using (6) equations (5) and (7) can, respectively, be rewritten as follows. 
 
 LX LS SY U Sa X a a Y L L          (5’) 
and, 
 KX KY KS Sa X a Y K a L   ,       (7’) 
 
respectively, where KY KY KS SYa Y a a a   is the amount of capital required to produce one unit 
of good Y directly and indirectly (through skill formation) and  LS SY SYa a a  is the 
amount of  “unskilled” labour used in sector Y indirectly through skill formation. Thus, sector 
S is vertically integrated with sector Y. The vertically integrated sector Y uses capital and  
“unskilled” labour to produce its output.  
 
 
 
                                                           
 
7 In India this grant is usually provided by the UGC. 
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Assumption 1: We assume that 
(i)  ( / ) ( / )LX KX LS KSa a a a    or  ( ) 0LX KS LS KXa a a a   
 
(ii) ( / ) ( / )LX KX SY KYa a a a    or  ( ) 0LX KY KX SYa a a a  . 
 
X, Y and S are agricultural, manufacturing and education sectors, respectively. Thus, it is 
sensible to assume that sector X is less capital-intensive relative to both sectors S and Y. 
Assumption 1 summarizes the factor-intensity conditions in the usual physical sense.  
 
Here, we define ij  as the proportion of the ith factor employed in the jth sector 
( , ,U Si L L K ; , ,j X Y S ), for example, /LX LX Ua X L  .  These are called the allocative 
shares. On the other hand, ij is the distributive share of the i th factor in the j th sector, for 
example, /SY S SY YW a P  . It can be seen that the factor intensity condition (i) can be 
expressed in terms of allocative shares as 
 
   (i’)  ( ) 0XS LX KS LS KX       , 
 
and that the factor intensity condition (ii) can be expressed in terms of distributive shares as8 
 
   (ii’) ( ) 0XY LX KY KX SY LS        . 
 
These factor intensities play very important role in the following analysis. 
 
 
3. Comparative statics 
 
Differentiating  (1) to (7) and writing in a matrix notation we obtain 
 
 
8 See the Appendix II for the derivation.  
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






 
 
 
 
 
  (8) 
 
where ˆ /Z dZ Z for any variable Z, ( ) 0X YKX KK KY KKA S S    , 
[ / ][ / ( )] 0S KS S KS Sa X R R a X     , ( / )( / ) 0R R      , / / ,LS LS U Ua S L S L   and 
/( )S SS L S   ; kjiS  the degree of substitution between factors j and i in the k th sector, 
, , ,j i L S K ; and, k = , ,X Y S . For example, 1 1 1( / )( / ),LK L LS r a a r    
)/)(/( 11
1 WaaWS LLLL   etc. 0
k
jiS  for ij  ; and, 0.
k
jjS   
 
 Solving (8) for Wˆ  and  ˆSW with respect to ˆ , we have equations (9) and (10).  
 
 ˆˆ / ( ) / 0KX SY KS SY XS LX KY SW                  (9) 
 ˆˆ / ( ) / 0S LX KY KS SY XS LX KY SW              ,    (10) 
 
where XS LX KS KX LS      ; and, 
 
 
( ) [ { ( )
} ( ) ( )]
X X
XY SY XS LX KY S KS S LX SY LX SY KX KK LK
Y Y Y X X
KY SK LX KY LX KY SY SS KS KX SY LX KX SY LL KL
S S
S S S S S
          
          
       
      
.      
             (11.1) 
It may be checked from (11.1) that 
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0   if (i) 0XS LX KS KX LS       ; and, (ii) 0XY LX KY KX SY LS         (11.2) 
 
Now we define the factor intensity in a special sense.  
 
Definition 1: Sector X is less (more) capital-intensive relative to sector Y in a special 
sense9 if and only if ( ) ( )0LX KY KX SY      . 
 
Here sectors X and Y use two different types of labour. However, there is one intersectorally 
mobile input which is capital. So, these two industries cannot be classified in terms of factor 
intensities which is usually done in the Hechscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model. Despite this, a 
special type of factor intensity classification in terms of the relative distributive shares of the 
mobile factor i.e. capital may be used for analytical purposes. The industry in which this 
share is higher relative to the other may be considered as capital-intensive in a special sense. 
 
It may be worth mentioning the relation between the usual factor intensity (Assumption 1 (ii)) 
and the factor intensity in a special sense. It can be easily shown that if sector X is less 
capital-intensive in a special sense, i.e., ( ) 0LX KY KX SY     , then sector X is less capital-
intensive also in the usual sense, i.e., ( ) 0.LX KY KX SY LS      This is because 1LS   and 
hence KX SY KX SY LS     . On the other hand, sector X can be more capital-intensive in a 
special sense, i.e., ( ) 0LX KY KX SY     , even if sector X is less capital-intensive in the usual 
sense. This happens when SW  and ( / )SY S SY YW a P   are sufficiently large. 
 
We define the inequality measure as ( / )SW W ⁭
10. Thus, the change in relative inequality is 
ˆ ˆ( )SW W . Subtracting (9) from (10) we obtain the following expression. 
 
 
 
9 Here sectors X  and Y  use two different types of labour. However, there is one intersectorally 
mobile input which is capital. So, these two industries cannot be classified in terms of factor 
intensities which is usually done in the Hechscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model. Despite this, a special 
type of factor intensity classification in terms of the relative distributive shares of the mobile factor 
i.e. capital may be used for analytical purposes. The industry in which this share is higher relative to 
the other may be considered as capital-intensive in a special sense. See Jones and Neary (1984) for 
details. See Jones and Neary (1984) for the details.  
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 ˆˆ ˆ( ) / ( )( ) /S KS LX KY KX SY SY XS LX KY SW W                   (12) 
With the help of (11.2) from (12) the following proposition can be easily established. 
Proposition 1: The infrastructure development scheme designed for skill formation 
lowers the skilled-unskilled wage inequality if LX KY KX SY KX SY LS        , while it 
increases the inequality if  KX SY LX KY KX SY LS        .⁮
11 
 
Totally differentiating (1) to (3), and collecting terms we can write 
 
  ˆ ˆ 0LX KXW r           (13) 
  ˆ ˆˆSY LS KY KS SYW r R       .       (14) 
 
It is assumed that an increase in   lowers the price of capital, R , required for skill formation. 
The decrease in R has the cost reduction effect in the integrated sector Y . This has 
qualitatively the same effect as the increase in the price of sector Y (i.e. YP ). By applying the 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem from (13) and (14) it follows that the fall in R  raises r and 
lowers W if LX KY KX SY LS     i.e. if 0XY  . From the zero-profit condition for 
sector Y (equation (2)) it follows that the skilled wage, SW , also falls as r rises. So 
bothW and SW fall as the capital cost rises in both sectors X andY . Which one of the two 
wages will fall more should depend on the distributive shares of capital in the two sectors. If 
( )LX KY KX SY     i.e. if ( )KY KX   the capital cost will increase more (less) in sector 
Y than in sector X and consequently the relative wage inequality improves (worsens).  
 
We have already mentioned that cost reduction effect in the vertically integrated 
sectorY resulting from a fall in R will have qualitatively the same effect as the increase in the 
price of commodity Y . This produces a Stolper-Samuelson effect which is followed by a 
                                                           
 
10 The absolute skilled-unskilled wage gap is ( )SW W . 
 
11  It should be noted that ( )LX KY KX SY     implies that ( )KY KX   as 
( ) 1 ( )LX KX SY KY       .  
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Rybczynski type effect as production technologies are of variable coefficient type. 
Consequently, the capital-intensive vertically integrated Y sector expands and the labour-
intensive sector X contracts. This leads to expansion in both sectors Y and S . So the following 
results are obtained.12  
 
 ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( / ) 0;( / ) 0X Y   ; and, ˆ ˆ( / ) 0S    .     (15) 
 
Now let us consider the consequences of an exogenous inflow of foreign capital.13  The effect 
of foreign capital inflows on wage inequality is qualitatively the same as the increase in 
domestic capital with respect to the positive aspect of the changes. Then, the effect of foreign 
capital inflow on the relative wage inequality can also be derived by solving (8) as follows. 
 
 ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) / ( ) /S KS S LX SY LX KY KX SYW W K            ,    (16) 
 
From (16) the following proposition readily follows. 
 
Proposition 2: An inflow of foreign capital increases the skilled-unskilled wage 
inequality if LX KY KX SY KX SY LS        while it decreases the inequality if 
KX SY LX KY KX SY LS        . 
 
Capital inflow decreases its rental, r. Thus, it can be seen from (1) and (2) that both W and 
SW must increase. If ( )LX KY KX SY     i.e. if ( )KY KX   , saving on capital cost will be 
more (less) in sector Y than in sector X . Hence the wage inequality rises (falls) following an 
inflow of foreign capital under the condition as stated in the proposition.  
 
An inflow of foreign capital produces a Rybczynski effect and leads to an expansion of sector 
S and a contraction of sector X as the former (latter) sector is capital (unskilled labour) 
intensive (i.e. 0XS LX KS KX LS       ). The vertically integrated Y sector also expands 
 
12 These results have been mathematically derived in Appendix  III. 
 
13 See footnote 3 in this context.  
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as 0XY  . As the return to capital, r , has fallen and the two wages have increased producers 
in both Y and X sectors substitute labour by capital. It is easy to check that KYa rises 
and SYa falls. Then from (6) it follows that Y sector expands due to factor substitution effect. 
So both the Rybczynski effect and the factor substitution effect move in the same direction 
and raise the production of Y . But the effect on sector X is not so obvious as the Rybczynski 
effect and the factor substitution effect move in the opposite directions to each other. The 
following results can therefore be proved.14 
 
  ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( / ) ?; ( / ) 0;X K Y K  and ˆ ˆ( / ) 0S K  .     (17)   
 
From (15) and (17) the following proposition can now be established. 
 
Proposition 3: An infrastructure development policy to the education sector and/or an 
inflow of foreign capital would promote skill formation and lead to expansion of the 
high-skill sector. 
 
 
4.  Policy implications of results and concluding remarks 
 
The developing countries have been giving top priority to skill formation for overcoming the 
scarcity of skilled labour. Apart from subsidization of the education system they are 
contemplating with the idea of allowing the entry of foreign capital into the education sector. 
In the circumstances, two pertinent questions are as follows: (i) how will the entry of foreign 
capital affect the process of skill formation and the relative earnings of different groups of 
workers? (ii) Is it a better policy option vis-à-vis the traditional policy of subsidizing the 
education sector through provision of infrastructure development grants under all situations? 
The present paper is designed to provide answers to the above questions in terms of a three-
sector general equilibrium model with endogenous skill formation. The analysis has found 
that both foreign capital inflows and provision of infrastructure development funds promote 
 
14 See Appendix IV for detailed derivations. 
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skill formation and produce expansion of the high-skill sector. However, the latter policy 
lowers both the skilled and unskilled wages while the entry of foreign capital produces 
completely opposite effects on the two wages. The effects of the two policies on the skilled-
unskilled wage inequality, on the other hand, depend crucially on the relative factor 
intensities of the low-skill and high-skill sectors. If the high-skill sector is capital-intensive in 
a special sense financial assistance program improves the wage inequality while a liberalized 
investment policy is counterproductive. On the contrary, if the low-skill sector is capital-
intensive the entry of foreign capital is preferable to a credit support program especially when 
the country’s objective is to alleviate the problem of rising wage inequality.  As factor 
intensities of the different sectors depend on technological, institutional and trade related 
factors of the economy the choice between the two alternative policies must ultimately hinge 
on these factors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
15 
15 
References: 
 
Chau, N. and Stark, O. (1999): ‘Migration under asymmetric information and human capital  
formation,’ Review of International Economics 7(3), 455-483. 
Chaudhuri, S. and Yabuuchi S. (2007): ‘Economic liberalization and wage inequality in the 
presence of labour market imperfection’, International Review of Economics and 
Finance 16, 592-603. 
Fan, C. Simon, and Oded Stark (2007): ‘International migration and “educated 
unemployment”,’ Journal of Development Economics 83, 76-87. 
Feenstra, R.C. and Hanson, G.H. (1996): ‘Foreign investment, outsourcing and relative 
wages’, in R. Feenstra, G. Grossman and D. Irwin (eds.), Political Economy of Trade 
Policies: Essays in Honor of J. N. Bhagwati, Cambridge, , MA: MIT Press.  
Jones, R.W. and Neary, P. (1984): ‘Positive theory of international trade’, in Jones, R.W. and 
P. B. Kenen (eds.), Handbook of Development Economics Vol. 1, North-Holland, 1-
62. 
Kar, S. and Beladi, H. (2004): ‘Skill formation and international migration: welfare  
perspective of developing countries’, Japan and the World Economy 16, 35-54. 
Marjit, S., Beladi, H. and A. Chakrabarti, (2004): ‘Trade and wage inequality in developing 
countries’. Economic Inquiry 42, 295-303.  
Marjit, S. and Acharyya, R. (2003): International Trade, Wage Inequality and the Developing 
Countries: A General Equilibrium Approach. Heidelberg: Physica/Springer Verlag. 
Sharma, K. (2007): ‘FDI in higher education : aspirations and reality’, Mainstream 45(25). 
Stark, O. et al. (1998): ‘Human capital depletion, human capital formation and migration: a 
blessing or a curse’,’ Economics Letters 60(3), 363-367. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
16 
16 
Appendices: 
 
Appendix I: Factor intensity 
 
The factor intensity in the usual sense is expressed as 
 
 {( )( / ) ( )( / )( / )}( / )
LX KY KX SY
LX KY Y KX S SY Y LS S Y
LX KY KX SY LS
a a a a
Wa ra P ra W a P Wa W P Wr
    

 
 
,  (A1) 
 
considering the price of good X is unity and 1LSa  . 
 
Appendix II: Changes in factor prices 
 
Solving (8) by Cramer’s rule we get 
 ˆˆ( / ) ( ) / 0KX SY KS SY XS LX KY SW                  (9) 
 ˆˆ( / ) ( ) / 0S LX KY KS SY XS LX KY SW              ,    (10) 
ˆ ˆ( / ) / 0KX SY KS LX SY SW K         ,       (A2) 
 
ˆ ˆ( / ) / 0S LX KY KS LX SY SW K         .       (A3) 
 
To obtain changes in r and R after totally differentiating equations (1) – (3) we get the 
following expressions. 
 
ˆ ˆ 0LX KXW r           (A4) 
ˆ ˆ 0S SY KYW r           (A5) 
 ˆ ˆ ˆLS KS SW R W   .        (A6) 
 
Since ˆ ˆˆˆ( / ) ( / )( / )LX KXr W     using (9) we find  
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ˆ ˆˆˆ( / ) ( / )( / )
( / ) ( ) / 0
LX KX
LX KX KX SY KS SY XS LX KY S
r W

   
         
 
     
  (A7) 
 
Similarly, 
 
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ( / ) ( / )( / )
( / ) ) / 0
LX KX
LX KX LX SY KX SY KS S
r K W K 
       
 
   
.    (A8) 
        
From (A5) and (A6) after using (A7) and (A8) we obtain 
 
 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) / ( / )S LS KS XY KSR W W W       .     (A9) 
 
By substituting the expressions for ˆˆ( / )W   and ˆ ˆ( / )W K  into (A9), we have 
 
 
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( / ) ( / )( / )
( / ) ( ) / 0
XY KX
XY KX KX SY KS SY XS LX KY S
R W

  
        
 
     
  (A10) 
 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( / ) ( / )( / )
( / ) ) / 0
XY KX
XY KX LX SY KX SY KS S
R K W K
      
 
   
.    (A11) 
 
 
Appendix III:  Changes in output composition due to change in   
 
Solving (8) for ˆ ˆ,X Y  and Sˆ with respect to ˆ , we have  
 
 
ˆˆ( / ) / [ { ( )
( )}
( )]
{ ( ) } 0
X
KS LX SY KX SY KS LK LS
Y X
KY SY LS SK KX S LK
Y Y
KY LS SY KY KS SS
X X X
KX KX SY SY LS KL KS LL KX S LL
X S A
S S
S S
S S S
        
    
   
       
  
 
 
   
, (A12) 
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ˆˆ( / ) [ { ( )
( )}
( )] / 0
X X
KS LX SY KX S KX LK LX KK
Y Y Y
KY LX S KY KS XS SY LX SY SS KY SK
X X
LX KX SY LX KL KX LL
Y S S
S S S
S S
        
       
    
  
   
   
   (A13) 
 
 
ˆ ˆ( / ) [ { ( )
( )}
( )] / 0
X Y
KS LX SY LX SY KX LK KY SK
Y Y
KY LX SY KY SS KS
X X
LX KX SY KX SY LL KL
S A S S
S S
S S
        
   
    
  
 
   
.    (A14) 
where  
 
( ) [ { ( )
( } ( ) ( )]
X X
XY SY XS LX KY S KS S LX SY LX SY KX KK LK
Y Y Y Y X X
KY KK SK LX KY LX KY SY SS KS KX SY LX KX SY LL KL
S S
S S S S S S
          
          
       
        
. 
            (11) 
0   under the assumptions that 0XS LX KS KX LS       and  
0XY LX KY KX SY LS        . 
 
Hence a credit subsidy policy designed for skill formation leads to expansion of both Y and 
S sectors and a contraction of sector X  under the assumptions: XS , 0XY  . 
 
Appendix IV: Changes in output composition due to change in K 
 
Differentiating the input-output coefficients and using the expressions for ˆ ˆ,SW W and rˆ it can 
be easily shown that we obtain 
 
  ˆˆ ˆ 0Y YSY SS S SKa S W S r          (A15) 
  ˆˆ ˆ 0Y YKY KS S KKa S W S r          (A16) 
    ˆˆ ˆ 0X XLX LL LKa S W S r          (A17) 
 
So SYa and LXa  decrease and KYa increases following an increase in K . 
 
Solving (8) for ˆ ˆ,X Y  and  Sˆ with respect to Kˆ , we have 
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 ˆ ˆ( / ) [ ( ) ] / ( )0X XSY KX SY KS S LX LK KX LL LS KY XYX K S S                 (A18) 
 
according to the condition ( ) ( )X XKS S KX SY LX LK KX LL LS KY XYS S           . 
 ˆ ˆ( / ) [ ( ) ] / 0Y YLX SY LX KS S KY SS SY SK S XYY K S S                 (A19) 
and, 
 ˆ ˆ( / ) / 0LX SY XYS K      .       (A20) 
 
Hence an inflow of foreign capital leads to expansion of both Y and S sectors under the 
assumptions: XS , 0XY  . However, the effect on sector X is ambiguous. 
